Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

5-11-1951

Pasadena v. County of Los Angeles
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Pasadena v. County of Los Angeles" (1951). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 420.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/420

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

1951] CITY

OF

PASADENA v. CouNTY

OF

Los ANGELES 129

[37 C.2d 129; 230 P.2d 801]

tations to his clients. Moreover, had a contest been successful, the recovery would not have been negligible. The net
value of the estate was approximately $1,934. The next of
kin, nieces and nephews, numbered seven, two of whom were
clients of petitioner. Each of petitioner's clients, therefore,
would have recovered approximately $276.
Even if petitioner's clients did not suffer loss by his
misconduct, he would not avoid disciplinary action. (Lady v.
State Bar, 28 Cal.2d 497, 504 [170 P.2cl 460] ; Picket·ing v.
State Ba1·, 24 Cal.2d 141, 145 [148 P.2d 1] ; Utz v. State Bar,
21 Cal.2d 100, 105 [ 130 P .2d 377].) Without authority of his
clients petitioner dismissed the contest. Thereafter, he repeatedly misrepresented the status of the contest proceeding
and kept his clients in ignorance of his unauthorized dismissal. When complainants on their own initiative uncovered his deception, the opportunity to contest the will had
passed. By his duplicity petitioner destroyed the claims of
his clients, which he was engaged to protect and enforce.
Such conduct involves moral turpitude and warrants the discipline recommended. (Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Cal.2d 580
[122 P.2d 549] ; Marsh v. State Bar, 210 Cal. 303, 307 [291 P.
583] .)
Petitioner is suspended from the practice of law in this
state for a period of nine months commencing thirty days
after the filing of this order.

[L. A. Nos. 21002, 21003.
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May 11, 1951.]

CI'rY OF PASADENA, Respondent, v. COUNTY OF
LOS ANGELES, Appellant.
[1] Taxation-Exemptions-Municipal Property Outside Municipality.-Const., art. XIII, § 1, excepting from tax exemption
such lands and improvements of a municipal corporation lying
outside its corporate limits as were subject to taxation when
acquired by the municipality, is not concerned with assessed
valuation 'before or after such acquisition, but deals only
with whether any improvements were constructed by the city
after it acquired the property.
[1] See 24 Cal.Jur. 101; 51 Am.Jur. 555.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Taxation, § 74.
37 C.2d-5
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[2] !d.-Exemptions-Municipal Property Outside Municipality.Tn excepting from tax exemption such lands and improvements
of a municipal corporation lying outside its corporate limits
as were subject to taxation when acquired by the municipality, Const., art. XIII, § 1, intended to preserve for taxation not
only the identical improvements existing at the time of acquisition, but also substitutes for the same and replacements
thereof, as distinguished from those of an entirely new character not theretofore existing in any form.
[3] !d.-Exemptions-Municipal Property Outside Municipality.To come within the constitutional exemption from taxation,
improvements constructed by a municipal corporation on
property lying outside its corporate limits must be wholly new
structures, and replacements of improvements existing on such
property when acquired by the city are not improvements
within such exemption.
[ 4] !d.-Exemptions-Municipal Property Outside Municipality.Replacements of improvements existing on property outside
the corporate limits of a municipality at the time of its
acquisition by the city are taxable according to the current
value of the "replaced improvements" and not aceording to
the value of the original improvements.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Reversed.
Actions to recover taxes paid under protest. Judgments for
plaintiff on overruling demurrers to complaints and defendant's failure to answer, reversed.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, A.. Curtis Smith,
Assistant County Counsel, and John D. Maharg, Deputy
County Counsel, for Appellant.
H. Burton Noble, City Attorney, and Frank L. Kostlan,
Assistant City Attorney, for Respondent.
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney (Los Angeles), and Gillmore Tillman, Chief Assistant City Attorney, as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Respondent.
CARTER, J.-In two actions to recover taxes paid under
protest by plaintiff city to defendant county, one for the fiscal
year 1945-46, the other for the fiscal year 1946-47, defendant's
demurrers were overruled, and it failing to answer, judgments
for plaintiff were entered.
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The controversy involves the application of the constitutional provision reading: ''All property in the state except
as otherwise in this Constitution provided, not exempt under
the laws of the United States, shall be taxed in proportion
to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law, or as hereinafter provided . . . provided, that property . . . as may belong ... to any . . . municipal corporation . . . shall be exempt from taxation, except such lands and the improvements
thereon located outside of the ... municipal corporation
owning the same as were subject to taxation at the time of the
acquisition of the same by said . . . municipal corporation;
provided, that no improvements of any character whatever
constructed by any . . . municipal corporation shall be subject to taxation. All lands or improvements thereon, belonging to any . . . municipal corporation, not exempt from taxation, shall be assessed by the assessor of the county . . . in
which said lands or improvements are located, and said assessment shall be subject to review, equalization and adjustment
by the state board of equalization.'' (Cal. Const., art. XIII,
§ 1.)
Plaintiff pursued its administrative remedy (see City &
County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo, 36 Cal.2d
196 [222 P.2d 860]) and was denied relief by the State Board
of Equalization.
The facts fitting the law as declared in the constitutional
provision quoted are : That plaintiff owns property and improvements thereon consisting of a water system located outside its city limits, but within defendant county which were
subject to taxation at the time of their acquisition; that defendant's assessor assessed for taxation those improvements
at $56,310 for the first year and at $51,640 for the second
year; that certain of said improvements were constructed by
plaintiff since acquisition of the property by it ''to replace''
improvements that were subject to taxation at the time of
acquisition; that the assessor placed a value on the "replaced
improvements" on the basis of the value thereof as they existed on the first Monday of March of the respective years,
although the ''replaced improvements'' were larger and more
substantially constructed, and of greater value than the improvements they replaced; and that they were constructed to
serve a different purpose in that they were larger and would
serve more parts of the water system.
Plaintiff contends that the assessor should have fixed the
value of such ''replaced improvements'' at the value the
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original improvements would have had as of the first Monday
in March of the respective tax years, rather than the value
at that time of the "replaced improvements" which is a much
higher figure. In other words, it says that when improvements
are replaced, the replacements should not be taxed at their
current value, but at the current value of the improvements
originally on the property when acquired, because the increased
value, by reason of the replacing of the original improvements,
is, in effect, a new improvement which is not covered by the
exception to the exemption in the constitutional provision
above quoted. We cannot agree.
[1] The constitutional provision is not concerned with
assessed valuation before or after acquisition by the municipal
corporation. It deals only with whether or not any improvements were constructed by the city after it acquired the property. They either are or are not improvements so constructed
regardless of their value. The first part of the constitutional
provision deals with valuation as distinguished from the part
here involved, which, by its languag·e, embraces what property
is taxable. While the precise issue here was not involved,
the whole tenor of the cases heretofore decided by this court
points to this conclusion. (City & County of San JfTancisco
v. County of San Mateo, 17 Cal.2d 814 [112 P.2d 595]; City
& County of San JfTancisco v. County of San Mateo, supra,
36 Cal.2c1 196.) In the first case the issue was whether a
concrete flume which the city built to replace a wooden one
was an improvement constructed by the city after acquisition
of the property and thus exempt from taxation. [2] vVe held
it was not exempt as it was only a replacement, and stated:
''In furtherance of that purpose the intent of the amendment
must have been to p1"eserve for taxation not only the identical
improvements existing on the property at the time of the
acquisition of the property by the m~micipality, but also S1tbstitutes for the same and replacements thereof. The improvements constructed on the property by the municipality which
are exempt, are only such as are of an entirely new character
ancl not theretofore existing in any foTrn. In this connection
it may be noted the words 'construct, constructed and construction' generally import the creation of something new and
original that did not exist before rather than replacement,
repair or improvement. [Citations.] Otherwise by merely
repairing, enlarging· or replacing existing improvements, the
county in which the property was located would lose the tax
revenues formerly received from such improvements, while
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the municipality would be enjoying the same use and benefits
from the improvement as it did prior to the replacement, at
least to the extent of the value of the improvement. as it
originally existed.'' (Emphasis added.) In the second case
the problem was whether a fill made after acquisition was an
and thus exempt from taxation. We held it was
pointing out that the test was whether the fill constituted an improvement, stating (p. 198): "If the fill constitntes an
as contemplated by the constitutional
amendment, it is to that extent exempt, and the county had no
power to take it into consideration in making the assessment
. . . Retained within the exemption provision were 'improvements of any character whatever constructed' by the city.
'Construction' or 'constructed' means the creation of somethat did not exist before as distinguished from replacement or repair. (San Francisco v. San Mateo Connty, sttpra,
17 Cal.2d at 819, citing cases.) The obvious purpose was to
permit the assessment of the property which was in existence
at the time it was acquired by the city. The assessment in
successive years of that much of the municipally-owned propwas made subject to review, equalization and adjustment.
'l'he phrase 'improvements of any character whatever' must
be held to include any addition (i.e., excluding matters of
ancl replacentent) to the property as it was when
acquired. The amendment does not define 'improvements'
beyond the descriptive language 'improvements of any character whatever.' It is difficult to perceive what more inclusive
language could have been employed to express the intent to
preserve to the county a continuation of the property on the
tax rolls as a source of revenue restricted, however, in each
successive year to an equalized valuation of the property before
the addition of any construction." (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff argues that in the first case the assessed value was
the current value of the original improvements. Be that as
it may, the point stressed is, what may be taxed.
[3,
It argues that the purpose of the constitutional provision is to keep on the tax rolls improvements ''as were subject
to taxation at the time of the acquisition of the same" and
that where improvements are replaced they are not such as
were subject to taxation at that time. But the constitutional
provision goes on to say specifically what improvements are
exempt from taxation; namely, those which were construct eel
by the city, and we held in the first San Francisco case, supra,
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that to be such improvements, they must be wholly new structures, that replacements of existing improvements were
simply not improvements of the exempt class. As seen, the
issue is not one of valuation. This should be clear, for if the
replacement eliminates the old improvement, there is no
longer any improvement to tax, unless we look to the replacement. When we do that we have something to tax, and the
question is, what is that something, not what is its value.
If we tax it by the current value of the old improvement, we
are not taxing an article of property ; we are taxing a fiction.
The difference in value does not make two separate articles of
property. If the fiction is to be employed as the basis for
fixing value, it would violate the spirit of the forepart of the
above quoted constitutional provision that all property shall
be taxed according to its value, for the replaced improvement
would not be taxed according to that value.
The judgments are reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J.,
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied June 7,
1951.

[L. A. No. 21143.

In Bank.

May 11, 1951.]

ALFRED B. CASON, Respondent, v. THE GLASS BOTTLE
BLOWERS ASSOCIATION etc., et al. (an Unincorporated Association), Appellants.
[1] Associations-Intervention of Courts.-Mandate is available
in this state against an unincorporated association.
[2] Appearance-General Appearance-Waiver of Process.-In a
mandamus proceeding seeking restoration to union membership, the court does not err in refusing to quash service of
summons, where defendants waive such service or defects
therein by making a general appearance.
[1] See 3 Cal.Jur. 354; 4 Am.Jur. 466.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Associations, § 12; [2] Appearance,
§26; [3] Mandamus, §101; [4,5,7-10,12-20,22-25] Labor, §20;
[6] Actions,§ 73; [11] Associations,§ 13; [21) Appeal and Error,
§ 1560-1.

